Abstract-This paper proposes a cooperative mechanism for detecting potentially deceptive cyber attacks that attempt to disregard average voltage regulation and current sharing in cyber-physical dc microgrids. Considering a set of conventional cyber attacks, the detection becomes fairly easy for distributed observer based techniques. However, a well-planned set of balanced attacks, termed as the stealth attack, can bypass the conventional observer based detection theory as the control objectives are met without any physical error involved. In this paper, we discuss the formulation and associated scope of instability from stealth attacks to deceive distributed observers realizing the necessary and sufficient conditions to model such attacks. To address this issue, a novel cooperative vulnerability factor (CVF) framework for each agent is introduced, which accurately identifies the attacked agent(s) under various scenarios. To facilitate detection under worst cases, the CVFs from the secondary voltage control sublayer is strategically cross coupled to the current sublayer, which ultimately disorients the control objectives in the presence of stealth attacks and provides a clear norm for triggering defense mechanisms. Finally, the performance of the proposed detection strategy is simulated in MATLAB/SIMULINK environment and experimentally validated for false data injection and stealth attacks on sensors and communication links.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
C microgrids are an effective means of integrating renewable energy sources, storage devices, and modern electronic loads, capable of operating independently of the utility grid [1] , [2] . Moreover, the operating nature of these units in the dc paradigm makes it a vivid option to enhance the efficiency [3] . For enhancing the scalability and robustness, distributed controllers are desirable in microgrids [4] , [5] to avoid single point of failure as compared to the centralized communication, S. Mishra is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi 110016, India (e-mail:,sukumar@ee.iitd.ac.in).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPEL. 2018.2879886 owing to their highly reliable operation during link failures. Moreover, distributed control philosophy is an economic option since it can be easily accommodated by transmitting lesser volume of data without entailing much traffic in contrast to the centralized communication [6] . In dc microgrids, cooperative secondary controllers have been deliberately used for various objectives, such as average voltage regulation [7] , proportional load sharing [8] , and energy balancing [9] .
To enhance the scope of reliability, system security plays an increasingly important role in maintaining unbiased coordination among the sources since it directly affects the technological aspects based on penalties specifically allocated for poor performance metrics [10] . Few potential ways to violate security measures are cyber attacks, which typically include false data injection attacks (FDIAs) [11] , denial of service (DoS) [12] , replay attacks [13] , etc. Such attacks are adept at disrupting the network stability as well as control structures. Several instances have been reported in the past, which became a critical concern for the control centers [14] . FDIAs alter the system state by injecting a false data into any of the compromised sensors/actuators. An example of implementation of such attacks is given in [11] . To analyze the impact of such attacks, further investigation is done in [15] to assess their impacts on the economic load dispatch that is realized in a cooperative manner. In this respect, the system under attack reaches a consensus stage that is not optimal. Broadly, detection and mitigation of conventional attacks are already well classified in the literature since such attacks disrupt the operation of observers that becomes a simple criterion for detection. However, it is reported that generalized FDIAs, commonly known as stealth attacks [16] , can easily penetrate into networked systems without altering the system observability. These attacks can be specifically classified as coordinated intelligent attacks [17] that involves coordinated attack vectors in multiple nodes to nullify system dynamics. As a result, the system/agent operator would be unaware of any online attack vectors present in the system. Prior to this, the attacker could cause an unfair increase in the magnitude of attack vectors that may cause system shutdown depending upon the severity of the attack. Additionally, implementation of such attacks gets easier when the attacker has obtained a priori knowledge about the system using adequate system monitoring [18] . More instances of coordinated attacks on large power systems and their vulnerability assessment are provided in [19] and [20] . In this regard, risk assessment along with control vulnerabilities is crucial since the modeling of coordinated attacks 0885-8993 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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for microgrids can be easier owing to their small system size without significant security measures [21] , [22] . In [23] , Hao et al. have identified an aberrant operation of a microgrid when a false data is injected into the voltage controller of the substation. Apart from stability, it is also crucial to analyze if the proposed strategies can attain economic vulnerabilities in a microgrid. In fact, this attribute is well addressed in [27] where the FDIAs are categorized by their utilization levels having monitored the stability of microgrids under different conditions. On the other hand, Beg et al. in [24] have stressed on the identification of the variation of candidate invariants to detect the presence of FDIAs. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that stealth attacks in dc microgrids can deceive the control system without creating any negative impact/disturbance. However, it is crucial to understand that such undetectable attacks, which are able to penetrate while maintaining discretion, can cause network instability in unforeseeable ways.
Since distributed observer based strategy [25] is more prone to cyber attacks for a well-spanned distributed graph as the injected false data propagates in the entire network, proper analysis has to be carried out toward the detection of the attacked agent in a microgrid to establish corrective action. False data propagation in dc microgrids may lead to loss of generality from an economic point of view, causing current sharing errors, which lead to circulating currents between each converter. Using distributed computation, the estimated states will converge to a non-zero steady value under FDIAs, which makes them simple to detect. In [28] , the compromised agent with false data is detected using a cooperative-based trust and confidence factors to realize mitigation of the propagation of false data in the cyber network. However, considering the worst case for such attacks, the above-mentioned factors can also be manipulated by adding/subtracting a large constant value while the controller is attacked, which may lead to false values corresponding to the attacked node. Consequently, it will result in maloperation of the mitigation strategy since it operates on non-attacked agent(s). In [26] , Fawzi et al. have determined a theoretical limit on the number of compromised sensors in a system beyond which it is impossible to characterize the detection of such attacks. Considering this view point, theoretical analysis for stealth attacks at multiple sensors/actuators in a cooperative network to create instability and the corresponding detection methodologies in dc microgrids has not gained significant attention yet. On the other hand, Zhao et al. [29] have addressed this issue for an economic dispatch problem as it decreases the overall efficiency with an increase in the generation cost by dislocating toward a nonoptimal point. However, it does not administer a mechanism for detection of the compromised agent during a stealth attack, which is crucial to cease its propagation into the network and may consequently lead to instability.
The idea behind stealth attack detection in this paper is the identification of the merits of a well-spanned network in a cooperative control mechanism. In particular, the difference between the secondary output of voltage sublayer, termed as cooperative vulnerability factor (CVF), converges to zero if the system is not under attack. Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient conditions for modeling of worst case stealth attack involving multiple sensors/communication links are studied extensively. Moreover, the impact of FDI and stealth attacks on sensors and communication links is studied for intrusion in voltage and current information separately to preserve system security and energy efficiency simultaneously. Since the distributed control philosophy in dc microgrids is based on voltage observer that can easily translate any uncoordinated data injection into a residual output, the authors have identified the concept of balanced attacks as stealth attack modeling with further investigation on its detection. Based on these findings, the CVFs of each agent determined from the secondary voltage sublayer are strategically coupled into the local current sharing secondary control loop. For this reason, any subsequent disruption/attack necessarily disorients the control operation of the agents, thereby serving as an apparent detection criterion considering that the attacker may attempt to manipulate CVF locally. On the other hand, the agent(s) representing positive value of CVF is resolved as attacked which suggests that their respective measurements are untrue. This can be easily extended to trigger the likely defense mechanisms to prevent further instability.
To sum up, the research contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) To ascertain the possibility of FDI and stealth attacks in dc microgrids, a new methodology based on a CVF is proposed using the outputs from secondary sublayers used for global average voltage regulation in dc microgrids. Generalization of distributed observers is done to detect such attacks and how it can be circumvented for a multiple sensor/link based stealth attacks. For detection of the compromised/attacked agent, CVF of each agent is locally monitored for positive values across the network that represents the attacked agent(s). This technique is used as an apparent method of detecting attacks locally such that corrective actions can take place. To the best of authors' knowledge, CVF has never been proposed in the realm of cyber-attack detection in microgrids. 2) A new cross-coupling methodology of the CVF output of each agent from the secondary voltage sublayer is proposed to strategically disorient the control operation for the worst case of consecutive attacks when the attacker can attempt to reduce CVF into a negative value so as to deceive the above-mentioned detection philosophy. Hence, the cross-coupling approach ensures accurate detection of the attacked agent(s) by prevention against further attacks into the proposed detection metric, i.e., CVF. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system architecture of dc microgrids along with cyber-layer preliminaries providing an overview of the secondary control strategy is illustrated in Section II. Section III depicts the problem formulation to demonstrate the behavior of cooperative control strategy under FDI and stealth attacks. Moreover, the necessary and sufficient conditions of modeling such attacks with multiple sensors/cyber link have been discussed in detail. Section IV provides a brief overview on the calculation of the CVF for each agent and its significance in the detection of such attacks. Simulations along with experimental validation are presented in Sections V and V, respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. CONVENTIONAL COOPERATIVE REALM IN DC MICROGRIDS
A. Cyber-Physical Model
The autonomous dc microgrid considered in this paper is shown in Fig. 1 . M dc sources connected via dc/dc converters of equal power rating are interconnected through tie lines, thereby constituting the physical layer of the microgrid. Each dc/dc converter operates to maintain the output voltage as per the reference values generated by the local primary and secondary controllers. An undirected cyber graph of the communication network is considered in this paper, which sends and receives information from its neighbors. Furthermore, loads are connected at the converter output of each unit. The simulated system parameters have been provided in the appendix.
Considering each source as an agent, the communication graph is represented as a digraph via edges and links via an adjacency matrix A = [a ij ] R M X M , which suggests the communication weights to be
where E is an edge connecting two nodes, x i is the local node, and x j is the neighboring node. It is to be noted that the communication weights depict information exchange between two corresponding nodes only. Mathematically, it can be denoted by a matrix with incoming information Z in = i M a ij . Hence, if both matrices match each other, the Laplacian matrix L is balanced, where L = Z in − A and its elements are given by
where deg(m i ) is the degree of the ith node and
All the units will achieve consensus using
where c is a constant, μ is a positive value, and M is the number of agents in the system.
B. Cooperative Control of Sublayers in DC Microgrids
The general philosophy of secondary cooperative realm in dc microgrids is to maintain the average voltage globally and share the currents proportionately using local as well as neighboring measurements such that the circulating currents can be reduced. These objectives are implemented using the secondary control sublayers in a cooperative manner using the following.
1) Sublayer I: Average Voltage Restoration:
For global average voltage regulation in dc microgrids, an average voltage estimateV dc i (k) for the ith agent is obtained using a voltage observer, which is updated via a dynamic consensus algorithm [30] using the neighboring estimatesV dc j (k) ∀ j N i , where N i denotes the set of neighboring agents. Mathematically, it can be represented for the ith agent as
where 
where
2) Sublayer II: Proportionate Current Sharing:
Similarly, the normalized current regulation cooperative input for the ith agent using the neighboring output current measurements I dc j , ∀ j N i , is given bȳ
where c i , I dc i (k), and I max dc i
and I max dc j denote the desired coupling gain, measured output current in the ith agent, and maximum output current allowed for the ith agent and jth agent, respectively. To establish these objectives for an agent operating to regulate output voltage, two voltage correction terms for the ith agent are calculated using
Remark 2: Generally, the line impedances between agents in a microgrid are significantly different, which usually introduces a poor current sharing profile using the primary droop concept without using communication [8] . However, by using (8), the voltage correction term ΔV 2 i (k) from the secondary controller compensates for the cable resistance as well as carries out proportionate sharing under different load conditions. As a result, the value of ΔV 2 i (k) is globally asymmetric in a microgrid with different tie-line resistances.
Remark 3: Using the cooperative-based consensus algorithm for a well-connected cyber graph for a dc microgrid, the solutions in (3)-(6) shall converge to
It should be noted that I dc ref in (8) has been kept zero for the load currents to be shared proportionately. However for FDIAs in single sensor/communication link, (10) modifies to
Assuming a pre-condition that the system always operates at a certain global reference voltage is known to each agent, (11) should be a sufficient criterion to justify that the system is attacked by an external entity. Many likely potential attacks on dc microgrids, such as FDI and DoS [32] , jamming [33] , and distributed DoS [34] attacks, have already been well studied in the literature. These attacks can be caused using several cyber-physical amendments, such as jamming of cyber link, loss of measurements, data packets flooding, compromised communication servers, sensors, etc. However, Beg et al. [32] and Danzi et al. [33] have already established that such attacks disrupt the cooperative synchronization law [30] , which can be easily detected since (10) is violated. To provide a detailed explanation, the above-mentioned disturbances introduce an uncoordinated discontinuity in updating (5), which disrupts the consensus between agents, ultimately leading to (11) .
Intuitively, the attacker conducting a stealth attack is able to penetrate into the control system without the system operator's knowledge. Such attacks can have adverse effect in the long run as the attacker has access to multiple nodes after penetrating into the system without system operator's knowledge and can create unintentional generation outage, which may eventually lead to system shutdown. Under these circumstances, detection of the attacked node(s) in a cooperative network is yet another aspect so as to prevent the system from further instability. The modeling of such attacks and its associated agenda of instability is discussed in detail in the following section.
III. MODELING OF STEALTH ATTACKS IN COOPERATIVE DC MICROGRIDS
Considering the attacker injecting false data into multiple sensors/communication links to formulate a stealth attack, an analysis of how the convergence in (10) can be guaranteed is provided in this section. Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient conditions to formulate a stealth attack on multiple sensors in a cooperative network is given in detail.
For each agent, the local power balancing equation can be expressed in terms of
where I o i (k) denote the total output current from the ith agent. Using (12) , the consensus algorithm in (3)-(6) under attacks can be rewritten as
where u a V i (k) and u a I i (k) denote the attack vectors imposed into voltage and current secondary sublayers in the ith agent at the kth instant, respectively. It should be noted that since χ i (k) is not a physical measurement entity, the possibility of attack in χ i (k) will be entirely due to u a I i (k). To provide with the basic understanding and investigating the effect of stealth attacks in multiple sensors/links in a cooperative network based dc micro- grids (rated voltage of 315 V), a case study in Fig. 2 is done by injecting a balanced set of zero sum errors s and −s into the voltage sensors in agents I and III, respectively during t = 1 s, where s is a constant attack element. After initiating the attack, it can be seen thatĪ dc (k) andV dc (k) converge to their respective references as stated in (10) with the control objectives met satisfactorily without creating instability. Upon maintaining discretion for some time, the attacker attempts an unfair increase in the injected attack vectors by a large magnitude (highlighted as event A) at t = 2 s, which results into a new operating reference V a dc ref in (11) . A time gap of 1 s between the stealth attack and event A is intentionally considered in the case study to facilitate clear understanding. It should be noted that the attacker may introduce event A immediately at t = 1 s, which necessitates a faster cyberattack detection strategy. As the agents' voltage ramp up to the highlighted overvoltage threshold, agents I and III are automatically tripped as a measure of overvoltage safety (highlighted as event B). Hence, if a vigilant attacker manages to penetrate, such attacks can lead to various unintentional scenarios without any trace for failure assessment. This case study necessitates the study of stealth attacks using multiple sensors/links along with an authentic detection mechanism. As a consequence, we obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of system under such attacks in (13) .
Problem Statement: If there exist a constant R such that
Then, (13) in the presence of stealth attack shall converge as per (10) with lim k →∞ χ i (k) = 0.
Proof: Representing (13) in the form of
As A is primarily composed of Laplacian matrices in (13), its eigenvalues lie around zero and unit plane [35] . Since lim
converge to zero for a wellconnected graph, as per (10),
with M elements equal to 1 and 2M elements equal to 0. Hence, this proves the convergence of a stealth attacked system to the global reference set points in (10) . Additionally, the above-mentioned proof can be extrapolated to justify
under a stealth attack where I l i is the local load at the ith agent. Due to (16) , convergence of (12) is guaranteed. By the iterative rule, subtracting
Substituting for I dc i (k + 1) from (13) in (19) and taking limitation on both sides considering (12) as k → ∞, ∀i M, we get
A similar analysis can be carried out to determine the effect of u a V (k) in the convergence of the algorithm to get
using χ i (k + 1) andV dc i (k + 1) in (17) .
Remark 4:
Following the concept of cooperative synchronization [30] , the average voltage estimate in (5) tends to achieve consensus for all its elements for a spanning cyber graph such that LV dc (k) = 0 during steady state to reach a steady-state value of V dc ref 1. Alternatively, a similar representation can be given using e i 1 (k) in (7) such that LE 1 (k) = 0 reaches a steadystate solution of zero, where E 1 (k) denotes the vector notation of e i 1 (k). Using (21) as an attack vector for the above-mentioned consensus theory, it can be concluded that the steady solution is not affected for E 1 (k) owing to the consensus properties of a Laplacian graph [30] . Hence, it can be concluded that the final state convergence as per (10) is not affected even under stealth attacks since it gets nullified by the sum of false data injection in multiple sensors/links for a cooperative network as established in (20) and (21).
IV. PROPOSED STEALTH ATTACK DETECTION STRATEGY
This section discusses the detection of the attacked nodes in a cooperative network based dc microgrid. As opposed to the centralized systems where the global information is present at a single node, it is a complicated task to apprehend the attacked node in cooperative systems as intrusion in any agent affects the entire system for a strongly connected graph. To address the issue, this paper utilizes the concept of control output synchronization to detect the attacked node in a cooperative network where the input signals with attack vectors are deemed to achieve consensus. Following the convergence of the inputs, it is shown that how the difference in their respective PI controller outputs achieves consensus for the same global reference voltage.
Remark 5: Since the output current from an agent, as shown in Fig. 1 , is based on the voltage levels between two different points, a stealth intrusion in the agents' current values for operation at a particular load leads to change in voltage levels across the network thereby disproving (10) . In simple terms, it can be stated that the agent can recognize such attacks as it would result in the current sharing error. Such error may in turn cause undesirable effects, such as overloading of individual converters or reduced energy efficiency. This has been justified by a case study in Fig. 3 for FDI and stealth attack on current sensors in a dc microgrid shown in Fig. 1 of M = 3 agents. In Fig. 3(a) , a false data of −0.5 A is injected into the current sensor in agent I at t = 1 s, which immediately results into improper sharing thereby reducing energy efficiency. Similarly, in Fig. 3(b) , a stealth attack is attempted at t = 1 s by injecting a balanced set of zero sum attacks of ±0.5 A into the current sensors in agents I and II simultaneously, which deteriorates the current sharing profile. However, the average voltage is still maintained in Fig. 3(b) in contrast to the case for an FDI attack. With the basic assumption that each agent operator bears knowledge that the system is equipped with proportionate current sharing controller, the sharing error shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b) should be a sufficient criterion to identify attacks on current sensors such that a corrective action can take place; hence, it becomes an easier task to determine such attacks in a cooperative network. However, stealth attacks on voltage sensors in case of multiple sensors/communication links can be inconspicuous to identify. In other words, the agent voltages are maneuvered in such a way that the control operation in (10) still holds true even in the presence of such attacks.
Using Remark 5, the control input for voltage regulation is particularly used to present a strong case for a stealth attack in this paper. Hence, the control input for average voltage regulation [36] at the ith agent is given by
For various attacks in the ith controller, the attacked control input can be modeled as
Cyber-link attack:
where κ = 1 denote the presence of the attack vector or 0 otherwise and u a i (k) denotes the attack vector in the ith agent. By local investigation of u f i (k) in each agent, a non-zero synchronization error can be detected with the residual output, however, it is not a sufficient criterion for detection of the attacked node(s) in a cooperative network since comparison of each residue requires global information, which contradicts our case. To verify this case, the effort of the controller to synchronize the output for a given reference voltage is strategically used to indicate the occurrence of an attack. It can be ensured using (3) and (7) in sublayer I to give
for an attack within [k − 1, k] instant, which changes due to the momentary increase/decrease in ξ i (k) in (25) as an input for the attacked agents and its neighbors at the instant of attack vector injection in multiple sensors/cyber links in a microgrid. As a result, the change in the PI output in sublayer I can be written as
where δΔV
. Using the change in outputs obtained in (26) , a CVF C i (k) is calculated using the PI controller outputs for each agent, which has been used in this paper to determine the attacked nodes accurately. Mathematically, it can be represented as
for the ith agent, where h i is a positive constant. Moreover, using (7) and Remark 4, we get where ΔV 1 (k) denotes the vector notation of ΔV i 1 (k) in (7). Since sublayer I operates as a secondary controller to achieve asymptotic convergence, K
such that the time constant of the secondary layer PI controller (K
) is at least 20 times higher than the outer voltage controller in Fig. 4 to provide smooth response [37] , (28) can be rewritten using Remark 1 as
Using (29) and Remark 4, it can be concluded that cooperative synchronization law [30] holds true in the absence of attacks. However in the presence of attacks, (29) synchronizes to a nonzero value that varies on the magnitude of injected attack vector. The above-mentioned action can be justified by observing each secondary sublayer output in Fig. 5 for a stealth attack on multiple voltage sensors on agents II and III in a dc microgrid of different line resistances. It can be seen that the voltage correction terms from the average voltage sublayer in Fig. 5 (a) change symmetrically as compared to the current sharing sublayer in Fig. 5(b) following a stealth attack at t = 1 s. This attribute can be explained using Remark 2. Considering the system operating at a steady state, a step change of balanced zero sum attack u a i (k) is injected into two agents during the (k − 1)th instant, and (26) can be represented as Eliminating the first two terms in the right-hand side of (30) using Remark 4 and substituting (30) in (27) , it can be concluded that o i 1 (k) and o i 2 (k) will always lead to positive/negative values due to Γ i (k) for a balanced sum zero attack only on the attacked nodes. As a result, C i (k) of the attacked nodes will always reflect a positive value. This provides a sufficient criterion for the detection of the attacked nodes in case of multiple sensor/link based stealth attack in dc microgrids. Concluding the abovementioned discussion, the CVF algorithm for each agent will result into
However, under worst cases, C i (k) can also be manipulated by the attacker using subtraction to make it negative, which displeases our attack detection criteria. To handle these discrepancies, C i (k) is tactically added to e i 2 (k) in (8), which can now be rewritten as (32) such that the control operation will be disoriented locally, thereby allowing the agents to reliably detect the attacks. Since I dc ref = 0, the cross coupling of the CVF suggested in (32) will supplement to accurate detection and facilitates protection against attacks on CVF since C i (k) now forms the forward path between both secondary control sublayers. By doing so, further attacks on C i (k) will disorient the objectives laid down for the outer voltage controller in sublayer I since it disregards (10). The CVF output C i (k) when cross coupled into sublayer II introduces a ramp signal into its input. The ramp up/down of C i (k) can be explained using the addition of the term Γ i (k) in (30) , which ramps up/down indefinitely for k → ∞ unless the positive/negative attack vector is removed from the ith agent. Hence, the ramp up/down of C i (k) in the positive region qualifies as a sufficient criterion for the corresponding node to be declared as attacked in the cooperative realm for dc microgrids. Moreover, in Fig. 6 , it can be seen that the slope of C 1 (k) increases with increase in h 1 for a particular stealth attack in two (32) when introduced into the PI controller in sublayer II with the unity feedback output y i (k) can be calculated using 
Hence, (37) implies that for higher values of h i with constant K H 2 i , the system may quickly lead into an unstable zone owing to high steady-state error considering bounded stability, whereas for lower values of h i , it is difficult to determine the attacked node under worst scenarios of a stealth attack due to slow ramping. Since the main focus of this paper is to detect the attacked unit accurately alongside prevention of further coordinated attacks, it is a seemingly fair approach to include the cross-coupling strategy such that the defense mechanism can take place immediately without disrupting stability for lower values of h i .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed attack detection strategy is tested on a cyberphysical dc microgrid as shown in Fig. 7(b) with V dc ref = 315 V consisting of four agents of equal capacities interconnected to each other via resistive lines. It should be noted that each agent consists of a battery accompanied via dc/dc bidirectional converters, respectively, as shown in Fig. 7(a) . To test the performance of the proposed attack detection strategy for a cooperative dc microgrid, it has been tested against several disturbances, such as FDIA, stealth attack in multiple sensors, which usually goes undetected by distributed observers, and communication links, to detect the affected node such that necessary action can be taken to maintain security. The system and control parameters are provided in the Appendix. It should be noted that each event in the above-mentioned scenarios are separated by a certain time gap to provide clear understanding.
A. Behavior of Proposed Stealth Detection Strategy for Case Study I
For case study I in Fig. 2 , the behavior of the proposed strategy without considering input, output, and communication delay is shown in Fig. 8(a) . As the stealth attack is initiated at t = 1 s in agents I and III, the values of C 1 and C 3 rise up into the positive region suggesting those agents to be the attacked units. Further, the performance of the proposed strategy in response to case study I is tested with input, output (within the agent), and communication (between two agents) delays in Fig. 8(b) and (c). It should be noted that input and output delays are constant whereas communication delays are time varying [31] . As the distributed control law for dc microgrids provides rugged response to delays due to the dynamic averaging concept within an upper bound on the communication delay for a given wellspanned network [36] , the philosophy of the proposed detection strategy under delays will be unaltered if the cooperative synchronization law in Remark 4 holds true for the underlying control layer. As compared to Fig. 8(a) , it can be seen that the CVF of the attacked agents initially rise with different peak magnitudes under delays of τ in Δt = 1 ms, τ o Δt = 3.5 ms, τ d Δt = 45 ms, and 80 ms (Δt is the sampling time) in Fig. 8(b) and (c), respectively, which can be attributed to varying delay in achieving consensus due to delayed measurements and inputs. It is worth notifying that the results in Fig. 8(b) and (c) have been investigated for maximum value of delay in the network to test the robustness of the proposed strategy. Since the CVF values of the affected agent go instantly into the positive region in Fig. 8(a)-(c) , it can be concluded that the proposed strategy entails faster detection of stealth attacks even under delays.
B. Scenario I
In scenario I, the voltage sensor in agent I is attacked with u a 1 = −7 V at t = 1 s. As a result, due to the presence of a distributed voltage observer designed for each agent in (5), the average voltage estimate in Fig. 9 immediately dips to 313 V for each agent. Assuming that the reference voltage of operation is known to every agent, the error in average voltage estimate should serve as a sufficient criterion to detect the presence of FDIA in the system. However, the identification of the attacked agent still remains a question. This paper has dealt with this issue by observing C i (k) in (27) , which always converges to zero in the absence of attacks. In this case, it can be seen that the average voltage estimates do achieve consensus however, they synchronize to a different value V a dc ref .
When the PI output of the voltage sublayer change symmetrically as shown in Fig. 5(a) , o 1 (k) in (27) becomes comparatively apparent for the attacked node(s). Consequently, C 1 , as shown in Fig. 9 , rises up to 0.05 as per the proposed strategy, which suggests that either sensors/links in agent I are maltreated with an attack. Prior to the detection of the attacked node, a corrective measure is taken at t = 1.5 s where the outgoing links from agent I are deactivated. With link deactivation, it can be seen that the average voltage estimate restores back to 315 V. Another advantage with the proposed strategy is that it acts as a worthy index to denote if the injected false data is still active with the agent. When the injected false data is removed by the attacker at t = 2 s, C 1 immediately tends to zero. Since the system is secure, the deactivated link is restored back.
C. Scenario II
In scenario II, the outgoing cyber links from agent III are attacked with a set of attack vectors of ±3 V at t = 1 s such that the cumulative effect seen in a cooperative network is zero. Prior to initiating the attack, it is difficult to denote the attacked node from the average voltage estimate as both estimates diverge symmetrically. Considering this problem using a distributed observer based approach, norm of these errors would mistranslate into two attacked nodes, i.e., agents III and IV. This issue is well addressed using the proposed approach since C 3 , as shown in Fig. 10 , shoots up to 0.18 thereby suggesting that agent III is attacked. As a protective measure of security, the outgoing links from agent III are deactivated that brings the average voltage estimate into synchronism by tracking the desired reference value of 315 V. For load changes highlighted as A and B, the system performs satisfactorily. To test the robustness of the proposed approach under worst case scenarios, another consecutive attack at t = 2 s is preempted by the attacker to manipulate C 3 by reducing it to a negative value. However, due to cross coupling of C i (k) into sublayer II in (32) , it prevents further exploitation as it cannot disorient the nested control output for a particular operating point.
D. Scenario III
In scenario III, a balanced attack of ± 10 V in sensors of agents I and IV at t = 1 s is practiced in Fig. 11 to test the fidelity of the proposed approach. As C 1 and C 4 shoot up in the positive region, agents I and IV are plugged out of the system at t = 1.5 s. Based on [28, Assumption 2], the network connectivity is affected due to plugging out of M /2 agents, which leads to change in system dynamics. On clearing out the attack at t = 3 s indicated by C 1 and C 4 dropping to zero, the converters are plugged back in around t = 3.2 s resulting into restoration of the average voltage estimates to 315 V.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed strategy has been experimentally validated in a dc microgrid comprising two agents, as shown in Fig. 12 . Two lead-acid battery banks, where each bank consist of three batteries in series for an overall input voltage of 36 V, are connected to the loads via dc/dc boost converters of equal capacities and tie lines operate to achieve average voltage regulation and share the load current proportionately among themselves. The analog measurements received from Hall effect transducers, LA 25-P and LV 20-P, from each agent are acquired via two local controllers equipped with Xilinx board as highlighted in Fig. 12 . Agent I is controlled using a National Instruments sbRIO 9683 chassis (Target I) with embedded data acquisition card sbRIO 9606. On the other hand, source II is controlled using an NI PXIe-8840 (Target II) with data acquired using NI PXIe 7853R series boxes and the control algorithms are implemented in LabVIEW that provides a GUI to produce respective gating signals for both the converters. The sensor attacks on the voltage sensors were modeled using (23) . The experimental testbed parameters have been provided in the Appendix.
A. Scenario I
In Fig. 13(a) , when a false data of u a,1 1 = 3 V is injected into the voltage sensor in agent I during event A, it leads to an increase in the voltage observer output. Consequently, the voltage of agent II also increases from 48.1 to 51.6 V. This results into increase of C 1 from 0 to 0.2 V, which ensures the attack vector in agent I. After a certain instant, when the link from agent I is deactivated, which halts the propagation of false data during event B, agent II voltage returns back to 48.1 V. However, the injected false data is still effective that is evident from C 1 in Fig. 13(a) . Under the worst case, the attacker may try to manipulate C 1 into the negative region such that the disabled link is restored. In event C, another attack vector u a,2 1 = −1.2 V is injected into C 1 , which does not affect its detection philosophy as it is strategically oriented into the control system of each agent using the cross-coupling methodology. Fig. 13(b) , a stealth attack is modeled by injecting a balanced set of zero sum vectors u f i = ±3 V into voltage sensors of both the agents prior to event A. Following the transient, both the voltages return back to their respective set points before attacks. However, C 1 and C 2 increase from 0 to 0.2 V, which suggests that both agents are attacked. To prevent further damage, a corrective action by disabling the cyber links during event B in Fig. 13(b) results into local operation for each agent.
B. Scenario II
Similarly in
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a general cyber-attack detection framework for cyber-physical dc microgrids. The vulnerability of the conventional cooperative techniques in dc microgrids under false data injection is investigated in detail. In addition to that, the modeling of stealth attacks, which manage to deceive distributed observers, is carried out using necessary and sufficient conditions. To address this issue, a CVF algorithm is presented that operates on the PI output of the voltage observer to track changes for each agent so as to provide an accurate identification strategy of the attacked agent(s). To add fidelity, it is cross coupled with the secondary current sublayer such that it operates under worst scenarios of attacks. Its robustness is evaluated using both simulation and experimental results for both false data injection and stealth attacks on multiple sensors/links.
APPENDIX
A. Simulation Parameters
The considered system consists of four sources rated equally for 3 kW. It is to be noted that the line parameter R ij is connected from the ith agent to the jth agent. Moreover, the controller gains are consistent for each agent. 
B. Experimental Testbed Parameters
The considered system consists of two sources with the converters rated equally for 350 W. It should be noted that the controller gains are consistent for each agent. 
